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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
court in applying the expressis unius rule, has said that an exclu-
sionary clause excepting certain vehicles from coverage necessarily
allowed all others to be included.26
In conclusion, it should be mentioned that although the West
Virginia court in Laraway said that the policy was clear and unam-
biguous, it still noted as pertinent the evidence relating to the
pickup truck's use and construction. Will the court, if confronted
with a future case involving similar policy language as applied to
a pickup truck feel that such evidence is relevant? If the answer is
yes then the prospect for recovery is better, because a review of the
cases indicates that plaintiffs do stand a better chance of recovering
when emphasis is placed on the private nature and use of the
vehicle.
Craig R. McKay
Lotteries-Promotional Scheme Constituting a Lottery
Safeway Stores, Inc., operated ten retail grocery stores in Sno-
homish County, Washington. Each of the stores sponsored a
"Bonus Bingo" contest as part of its advertising activity. Winners
received cash awards. No purchase was necessary to obtain the
prize slips used in the game, but in order to obtain a sufficient num-
ber of prize slips to complete a winning card it was necessary to
visit the store. The contest was advertised extensively within the
store and in the general advertising of Safeway in the local news-
papers. Snohomish County sought a declaratory judgment on the
legality of the contest, and an injunction against continuance by
Safeway of the contest, alleging it constituted an illegal lottery. The
private passenger automobile of the pleasure car type); Paetz v. London Guar-
antee & Accident Co., 228 Mo. App. 564, 71 S.W. 2d 826 (1934) (vehicle was
licensed and registered as a Ford Runabout, but was used as a family car.)
"E.g., Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Assoc. v. Hudman, 385 S.W. 2d
509, 513 (Tex. 1964). The Texas statute defined a passenger car as any motor
vehicle, excluding a motor cycle or a bus, that was "designed or used primarily
for the transportation of persons." The court did not consider the statute con-
clusive, because it was adopted in a different context, but its persuasive value
was accepted.
"Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bidwell, 192 Tenn. 627, 241 S.W. 2d 595 (1943).
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Superior Court of Snohomish County entered a judgment in favor
of Safeway and the county appealed to the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington. Held, reversed, with instructions that the injunction be
issued. The "Bonus Bingo" contest was attended by the requisite ele-
ment of a lottery-prize, chance, and consideration-and was there-
fore enjoinable as a public nuisance. Schillberg v. Safeway Stores,
Inc., 450 P.2d 949 Wash. (1969).
The relevant law, under which this case was decided, was
taken from the Washington constitutional prohibition against state
authorization of any lottery,1 and from a statute declaring such
lotteries a nuisance- and, as such, enjoinable. The West Virginia
Constitution likewise prohibits state authorization of lotteries and,
further, directs legislative enactments to prohibit sale of lottery
tickets.3 The response of the West Virginia Legislature to this
constitutional direction was to impose a criminal sanction, in the
form of a misdemeanor, on those who operate a lottery.4
West Virginia is in agreement with the Washington court that
the "essential elements of a lottery are consideration, prize, and
chance."5 Phrased in other terms, the West Virginia court defines
a lottery as a "scheme for the distribution of prizes by chance."6
'WASHI. CONSr. art. II, § 24: "The legislature shall never authorize any
lottery .... "
'WASH. Rrv. CODE § 9.59.010 (1955):
A lottery is a scheme for the distribution of money or property by chance,
among persons who have paid or agreed to pay a valuable considera-
tion for the chance, whether it shall be called a lottery, raffle, gift enter-
prise, or by any other name, and is hereby declared unlawful and a
public nuisance.
•W VA. CNsr. art. VI, § 36: "The legislature shall have no power to auth-
orize lotteries or gift enterprises for any purpose, and shall pass laws to pro-
hibit the sale of lottery or gift enterprise tickets in this State."
"W. VA. CODE ch. 61, art. 10, § 11 (Michie 1966):
If any person shall set up or promote or be concerned in managing or
drawing a lottery or raffle, for money or other thing of value, . .. or
knowingly permit the sale . . . of any chance or ticket .... or other
device purporting or intended to guarantee or assure to any person, or
to entitle him to a prize, or a share of, or interest in, a prize to be drawn
in a lottery, or shall, for himself, or any other person, buy, sell, or trans-
fer.., any such writing, certificate, bill, token or device, he shall be
puitty of a misdemeanor ....
See State v. Hudson, 128 W. Va. 655, 664, 37 S.E. 2d 553, 558 (1946): "[A]nd,
where they are present and chance predominates, even though skill or judgment
may enter to some extent in the operation of a particular scheme or device, the
scheme or device is a lottery." (The purpose of this paper is to illustrate
how the courts have found the elements of lottery present and not to distin-
guish between sanctions imposed.)
'State v. Matthews, 117 W. Va. 97, 99, 184 SE. 665, 666 (1936).
1970]
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These definitions seem simple enough on the surface to permit
clear application to any situation in question, but this has not been
so in practice. An examination of several cases indicates that the
problem of applying the lottery approach to business promotional
schemes lies in the difficulty of finding "consideration."
One of the earlier applications of the lottery prohibitions to
business was against the so-called "bank nights" conducted by
theaters. The idea was that by signing a registration card people
had a chance to win cash or other valuable prizes in a drawing. In
a Washington case, Society Theatre v. City of Seattle,7 the patrons of
the theater were given a prize ticket for a random drawing for
groceries. There was no charge for the chance ticket other than
the cost of an admission ticket. Having no trouble finding the
elements of prize and chance, the court went on to rest a finding of
consideration on the idea that the theater received a benefit from
the patronage which the contest drew. In a similar West Virginia
case s the scheme called for registration for a drawing by signing a
card. The court upheld an instruction that where the elements of
prize and chance were present, the defendant was guilty
of conducting a lottery provided there was present the add-
ed factor of an intent to attract additional persons to the theater,
combined with the fact of purchase of tickets by any such persons.
The court further held that the scheme had to be judged on the
whole and that the defendant could not be relieved from respon-
sibility merely because a few people were allowed a chance without
having to purchase an admission ticket. 9 Other jurisdictions seem to
be generally in line with this view of "bank night."'1
The "bank night" schemes represent only one area in which
courts have found business promotional schemes to constitute illegal
'118 Wash. 258, 203 P. 21 (1922) ; accord, State v. Danz, 140 Wash. 546, 250
P. 37 (1926).
'State v. Greater Huntington Theatre Corp., 133 W. Va. 252, 55 S.E. 2d 681(1949).
Id. at 265, 55 S.E. 2d at 689.
"See State ex reL. Cowie v. LaCrosse Theatres Co., 232 Wis. 153, 286 N.W. 707
(1939), in which the court found that a bank night scheme constituted a
lottery where most tickets were given to purchasers of admission tickets, even
though some chance tickets were given away free. But see Cross v. People, 18
Colo. 321, 32 P. 821 (1893). In considering a shoe store give-away, the court
failed to find consideration where a chance could be obtained by request made
by ma.i. It was further concluded that the hope of or actual inducing of patron-
age by the scheme was too remote to constitute consideration.
[Vol. 72
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lotteries. As early as 1928 a Texas court found that a promotion by
an association of service stations which consisted of chance drawings
for automobiles was a lottery."1 The decision rested on the fact that
most of the participants purchased products, though not required
by the rules, just as was the situation in Schillberg. The Texas court
determined that the patronage induced by the scheme was the
consideration which passed for the chance received.1 2
In commenting on State v. Greater Huntington Theatre Corp.'3
in an earlier volume of this publication,' 4 the writer discussed three
grounds on which courts have found consideration, i.e., (1) "con-
tract consideration," (2) "increased revenues" (from increased
patronage), and (3) "valuable consideration by payment in part for
the chance to participate." The writer placed West Virginia with
the courts using the third category. He went on to express the view
that the West Virginia court would no longer tolerate schemes de-
signed to evade the lottery statute under the guise of "free parti-
cipation."15
Perhaps one of the best discussions of the lottery approach
to business promotional schemes is in Lucky Calendar Co. v.
Cohen,8 a case on which the Washington court relied heavily. The
participants in this grocery store promotion were not required to
make a purchase to get the calendars containing prize coupons, nor
could they get the calendars in the store. The calendars were mail-
ed, winners were notified by mail or phone and prizes from the
drawing were delivered free of charge. The one act required of the
participant was to deposit the coupon at one of the supermarkets
involved. From this the New Jersey court found contract consider-
ation, sufficient to make the scheme a lottery:' 7
"Featherstone v. Independent Serv. Station Ass'n, 10 S.W. 2d 124 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1928). The plaintiff in this case was the operator of a service station
which was not part of the Association. He sought injunctive relief against use
of the lottery scheme by his competitors.
12Id. at 127.
"133 W. Va. 252, 55 S.E. 2d 681 (1949).
1452 W. VA. L. REV. 131 (1950).
15id. at 132.
"19 N.J. 399, 117 A. 2d 487 (1955). For discussion of this decision see 5
DF.PAUL L. REv. 308 (1956). Enactment of NJ.SA. 2A:121-6 (1961), six years
after this case may have had an effect on the New Jersey law as pronounced in
the decision.
"Lucky Calendar Co. v. Cohen, 19 N.J. 399, 415, 117 A.2d 487, 495 (1955)
(emphasis added).
1970)
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[T] he consideration in a lottery, as in any form of simple
contract, need not be money or the promise of money. Nor
need it be of intrinsic value . . . provided it is what is
asked for by the promisor and is not illegal. The law will
not inquire as to the adequacy of consideration when the
thing to be done is asked to be done, be it ever so small.
It can be seen that the concept of "consideration" is quite
adaptable when its presence is required. The underlying reason
for such results in many of the cases discussed seems to be a desire
by the courts to thwart efforts of businessmen to appeal to man's
"get something for nothing" weakness and to prevent the al-
legedly unwholesome influence on the community of such schemes.18
There is still no uniform finding of consideration in such cases,",
so that the conflict persists between a strict interpretation of the
requirements of the lottery statutes and the desire to protect the
general public from the appeal of "get rich quick" schemes.
Critics of the promotion schemes used by gasoline stations and
grocery stores in recent years recognize the efforts of the business
promoter to hide the element of consideration so as to avoid the
lottery tag. In answer to this it has been suggested that:z°
[I] f the operator receives a benefit in the form of increas-
ed patronage, business, and profit, this benefit should be
sufficient to constitute the necessary consideration. Busi-
nessmen are not so philanthropic as to give away something
for nothing. Certainly if they did not expect their addition-
al profits to offset the costs of the scheme, they never would
have undertaken it. And the mere fact that "some" people
could win without themselves having been detrimented
certainly should not be the factor removing such a scheme
from a lottery, for the greater proportion of participants do
indeed pay actual consideration-usually in the form of
increased prices.
'See Id. at 417, 117 A.2d at 497; State v. Hudson, 128 W. Va. 655, 665, 37
S.E. 2d 553, 558 (1946); Note, Lottery Approach to Promotional Schemes, 42
WAsi{. L. Rxv. 668, 669 (1967).
"See 17 D-PAuL L. REv. 555, 559 (1968). for a discussion of cases on both
sides of the consideration question.
1'Id. at 560-61.
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The court in the Schillberg case seemed to adopt this line of
reasoning when considering that "Safeway experienced a material
increase in business not attributable to any factor other than the
effects of Bonus Bingo .... The visit to a Safeway Store [to pro-
cure a prize slip] and a perusal of the promoter's advertising
amount to a consideration moving from player to promoter."2' 1
A somewhat different approach to regulation of business pro-
motional schemes hinges on the idea of unfair or deceptive practices.
If the complaining party can establish that the contest is deceptive,
he may demonstrate to a court that it is an unlawful practice,
which, if it yields a competitive business advantage may be deem-
ed an unfair method of competition. Though this approach may
serve to obviate the necessity of showing consideration to be pre-
sent, it does not appear to have gained widespread acceptance,
even where statutory provisions would facilitate its use. The con-
cept has, however, been used successfully in at least one case. 23
It would appear that the lottery approach based on constitu-
tional and statutory provisions similar to those in West Virginia,
for the control of business promotional schemes is the predomin-
ant attack used.
It becomes evident that such statutes are being construed
as prohibiting not only lotteries in the narrow sense of the
word, but also schemes in the nature of a lottery. By the
use of a broad construction, the courts have been able to
strike down schemes which apparently require no consider-
ation, but nonetheless are patent evasions of the spirit, if
not the letter of the statutes. Where such a view is taken,
the conflict over what is meant by consideration as used in
the statute is relegated to the position of a moot question-
no longer of any importance in deciding the case.24
No matter whether the traditional lottery concept, or
one of the other proposed approaches is used, there would seem to
be a growing concern for protection of consumers from the pos-
sible evils of the growing number of such schemes. The Schillberg
2Schillberg v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 450 P. 2d 949, 956 (Wash. 1969).
2See 42 WASH. L. REv. 668, 675 (1967), discussing the Washington Con-
sumer Protection Act, which received no mention in the Schillberg case.
1F.T.C. v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 804 (1933).
15 DEPAUL L. REv. 808, 312 (1956).
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case presents a good example of the judiciary taking a hand in
the protection. An even more recent attempt at control can be
seen in the recently adopted regulations of the Federal Trade
Commission, providing for full disclosure in gasoline and super-
market give-away games Concern has been expressed at both the
state and national levels. A consumer's choice of product or out-
let could be based, not on the quality he receives, but on what he
may be able to win "just for stopping in."
Where is it all going to end? Or is it? The answer may lie
with the courts, as indicated by the Schillberg decision. West Virgin-
ia has already initiated the lottery approach in attacking the "bank
night" promotions, and could conceivably use this as a stepping-off
point on the road to consumer protection against the more modern
schemes. But if the consideration element should become a major
obstacle, then perhaps legislative action might be desirable-for
regulation of fair and honest trade practices.
George William Lavender, III
Property-Recovery for Improvements Mistakenly Made
on the Land of Another
The plaintiff Somerville and defendant Jacobs owned adjacent
lots in the city of Parkersburg. Apparently relying on a surveyor's
report and plat, plaintiff had a warehouse built on what he thought
was one of his lots. The warehouse, however, was mistakenly con-
structed upon the defendant's property. Plaintiff then instituted a
proceeding for equitable relief in the circuit court. The trial court
entered judgment for the plaintiff and decreed that the defend-
ant either buy the warehouse for $17,500, have judgment entered
against him for that amount, or convey the lot upon which the
building was constructed to the plaintiff. Defendant appealed.
Held, judgment affirmed. A person, who through a reasonable mis-
take of fact constructs a building entirely upon the land of another,
'34 Fed. Reg. 13302 (1969).
[Vol. 72
7
Lavender: Lotteries--Promotional Scheme Constituting a Lottery
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1970
